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Abstract 
For a valid conclusion of a juridical act it is, firstly, necessary for a valid consent to exist. However, the mere 
existence is not sufficient. For the act to be valid it is necessary that the consent expressed for its conclusion is 
also valid. Therefore, beside the formal existence of the consent, a few more requirements need to be fulfilled. 
The requirements of the consent represent another subject insufficiently clarified. The present study is an attempt 
to clarify some of the aspects of this matter, that have been rarely analyzed by the Romanian doctrine, keeping in 
mind the future legal provisions. 
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Introduction
The subject of the present study is represented, as the title shows, by the requirements for the 
validity of the consent, excluding, though, the matter of the vices of consent, a subject matter so 
diverse that it needs a separate analysis. This matter has no yet received an exhaustive analysis in the 
Romanian legal doctrine. Furthermore, without bringing substantial changes to this matter, the new 
Civil  Code  (still  not  in  force)
1  calls  for  a  few  comments.  Therefore,  the  re-analysis  of  the 
requirements for the validity of consent, complemented by references to the new legal dispositions, 
is, without any doubt, very useful, especially given the importance of consent in the process of 
formation of the juridical act.
Paper content 
It is generally
2 admitted that for the validity of a juridical act, four cumulative conditions, 
regarding the consent, should be met: 
a) the consent must come from a person having discernment; 
b) it must not be altered by a vice of consent; 
c) it must be exteriorized; 
d) it must have been expressed with the intent of producing juridical effects.
3
I avoided naming them “validity conditions regarding the consent” and I presented them as 
“validity conditions of the juridical act required in connection with the consent” because some of 
them regard not so much the validity, but the very existence of consent. 
Thus, the third  of the  named requirements regards the  very  formal  existence  of  consent, 
presuming by definition an exterior manifestation, in the absence of which we can only talk about a 
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1 The  new  Civil  Code  has  been  adopted  by  Law  No.  287/2009,  published  in  the  Official  Monitory  No. 
511/24.07.2009, and it will come into force at a future date, to be established by the laws to be issued for its application. 
2 G. Boroi, Drept civil.Partea Generala. Persoanele, (Bucharest, 2010), 211, Gh. Beleiu, Drept civil român. 
Introducere în dreptul civil. Subiectele dreptului civil, 152. 
3 The new Civil Code expressly mentions these conditions (except for the one under letter c), which regards the 
very existence of consent), in a different enunciation. Thus, according to article 1204 of the new Code, the consent of 
the parties must be earnest, free and expressed wittingly. 303
decision that has been made, as a part of the psychological process thorough  which the will  is 
formed, having no juridical relevance. 
Then, the last requirement and, somehow, the second one too (and we take into consideration 
the obstacle error and some cases of duress ) regard the real existence of the consent, meaning that if 
they were not fulfilled we would find ourselves in the presence of an exterior manifestation, but this 
would  only  appear  as  consent  and  in  reality  the  latter  would  not  exist because  the  decision  to 
conclude the juridical act would not exist. 
Finally, the first and, generally the second condition indeed regard the validity of the consent, 
expressing the necessity for it to be the result of a witting and free will
4.
The consent must be clarified and free.
Firstly, the consent must be clarified. As any act of will, the decision to conclude a contract is 
preceded by a deliberation, in the course of which the interested person, analyzing the advantages 
and disadvantages of the operation they are considering, estimated that the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages.  This  deliberation  is obviously  illusive  if  the  person lacks  discernment.  Also,  the 
deliberation of the party can be distorted by error, either casual or provoked by the counterparty’s 
fraudulent manipulations. In the juridical terminology, the term error regards a casual fact. When the 
cause of the error consists in the manipulations of the counterparty or, in some cases, of a third party, 
the error is named undue influence.
These two vices affect the consent in its intellectual element: the party in error or that has 
been a victim of undue influence did not wittingly consent. 
Secondly,  the  consent  should  be  free. It  is  not  free  when  the  decision,  instead  of  really 
“rising” from a deliberation, is the result of a constraint brought upon the interested party which led 
him to accepting disadvantageous conditions – this time consciously – in order to escape the threats 
they faced in case they refused to conclude the contract. The third vice of consent, duress, affects its 
element of freedom.
5
However let us, in turn, analyze all these conditions. 
The consent must come from a person having discernment 
This  requirement  rises  from  the  conscious  character  of  the  civil  juridical  act,  the  later 
comprising the parties’ manifestation of will. The juridical act is first and foremost an intellective 
operation, as the will to conclude a contract presumes the knowledge of the elements of the projected 
operation, an operation which is “weighed” by  each party before its conclusion
6. Thusly it is a 
premeditated  juridical  operation,  as  the  parties  previously  take  into  account  all  the  resulting 
advantages and disadvantages. 
However, to this point it is necessary for each party to have the intellectual faculties needed to 
“comprehend” and, then, to “want”. 
In  other  words,  the  consent  must  be  given  by  a  person  that  acknowledges  the  juridical 
consequences which result from the conclusion of the juridical act, that can conceive not only the 
rights  they  would  acquire,  but  also  the  obligations  they  would  undertake.  And  this capacity of 
representing the consequences consists exactly in the existence of the discernment.
7
4  These  two  conditions  rather  regard  the  cause  of  the  juridical  act  and  only  indirectly,  by  way  of  the 
aforementioned, the consent. However, given that they are usually analyzed in connection with the consent, I shall 
follow these footsteps. 
5 See J. Flour, J.-L. Aubert, E. Savaux, Les obligations. 1. L´acte juridique, edition XII, (Paris, 2006), 143-144. 
6 I. Dogaru, Valen ele juridice ale voin ei, (Bucharest, 1996), 70. 
7 The lack of discernment is provided by the new Civil Code in article 1205. The disposition does not bring 
new elements, but, virtually, consecrates the doctrinal and jurisprudential conclusions. 304  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
The condition regarding the existence of the discernment must not be confounded with the 
condition  of  capacity
8,  although  they  are  strongly  connected  (the  discernment  representing, 
theoretically, a premise for acknowledging the capacity of concluding juridical acts). The capacity is 
a state of law (de iure), rising from the law, and the discernment is a state of fact (de facto), being of 
a psychological nature and needing to be assessed from person to person, taking into consideration 
their psycho-intellectual ability, although the law has provided some presumptions regarding it.
9
Hence, the private persons with full exercise capacity are presumed to have the discernment 
needed to conclude civil juridical acts. The one lacking exercise capacity (the minor under 14 years 
of age and the one under court interdiction) is presumed to lack discernment, either because of their 
young age, or because of their mental health situation. As for the minor between 14 and 18 years of 
age  it  is  generally  assessed  that  their  discernment  is  developing,  in  order  to  emphasize  the 
intermediary  situation  they  are  in.  but  this  situation  rather  regards  their  capacity  and  not  their 
discernment. From the hereunder point of view we must specify that the minor between 14 and 18 
years of age is presumed to have discernment, as , where the juridical acts which they can conclude 
on their own are concerned, according to the rules on capacity, their eventual lack of discernment 
must be proved by the one that invokes it. 
As a matter of fact, when we question the existence of discernment we are interested only in 
the acts concluded by persons who have full exercise capacity and those concluded by the person 
with restrained exercise capacity (the minor between 14 and 18 years of age) on their own, but for 
which the rules on capacity did not require a prior approval. 
The matter of the acts concluded by those lacking exercise capacity or of the acts concluded 
by those with restrained exercise capacity, but for which a prior approval is required, will be solved 
by the rules of capacity, an assessment on the existence of the discernment not being necessary. 
Beside the cases in which a person is presumed by law to be lacking discernment (legal 
incapacities), there are also cases in which persons that have discernment by law (for whom, as 
previously shown, a presumption of existing discernment operates) are in fact temporarily lacking 
discernment  (namely  cases  of  natural  incapacity).  For  that  matter,  have  been  mentioned 
drunkenness, hypnosis, somnambulism, rage (ab irato).
10
I want to specify that, in some of these situations, for example in the case of drunkenness, if it 
has been voluntarily caused, the counterparty could request damages for the prejudice caused by the 
annulment  of  the  contract  for  lack  of  discernment,  unless  of  course  they  had  contributed  to 
appearance of that state (in which case we could even be considering it to be undue influence) or they 
had somehow tried to take advantage of the respective state of the other party (immoral cause), 
situations in which he would be prevented from doing that by the existence of their own fault. 
To these aforementioned natural incapacities we must also assimilate the situation of the 
mentally alienated and weaklings before they had been placed under court interdiction, of course in 
the hypothesis they are adults. Thus, until the court interdiction, they could be considered to have full 
8 The French doctrine, when analyzing the ability to consent, took two elements into consideration: on the one 
hand, the incapacities – the matter of the persons for whom it s impossible to express a veritable consent, in connection 
with the lack of juridical capacity, and on the other hand, the spiritual insanity – where we consider persons that have 
juridical capacity, but that cannot acknowledge the importance of their acts and, therefore, cannot express a valid 
consent. For both situations the sanction is, on principle, relative nullity. For details, see F. Terré, Ph. Simler, Y. 
Lequette, Droit civil. Les obligations, 98-105. 
9 To the same effect, the jurisprudence has ruled: “the capacity of contracting, as well as the undertaking 
party’s valid consent are, in accordance with the dispositions of art. 948 Civil Code and Decree no. 31/1954, validity 
conditions for the juridical acts, the lack of either one being sanctioned with nullity. Even if one had not been declared 
incapable, according to the law, a valid consent cannot be deemed to exist if on the date of the conclusion of the act, for 
reasons of illness, the party was lacking discernment”, see H.C.C.J., s.civ., dec. no. 51/15.01.2003, in C.J. no. 4/2004, 
page 75. 
10 See Fr. Deak, Tratat de drept civil, II, 181 and quoted practice: Suceava Tribunal, s. civ., dec. no. 837/1972. 305
exercise capacity and, therefore, presumed to have discernment. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that 
the respective illness affects discernment and, therefore, any juridical acts they might have concluded 
could be annulled for the failure to fulfill this requirement regarding consent. In these cases it is 
possible that lucidity episodes appear. If the act was concluded during a lucidity episode, the cause 
for relative nullity under discussion no longer exists.
11
This situation is also taken into consideration by the new Civil Code. According to article 
1205 align. 2 of the new Civil Code, the contract concluded by a person that is subsequently placed 
under court interdiction can be annulled if, at the time of the conclusion of the act, the causes for 
court interdiction existed and were generally known. 
This disposition will generate controversy when applied in practice, the reason for it being 
adopted, given the enunciation, being far from clear. A grammatical interpretation of the sentence 
leads to the conclusion that nullity could be sanctioned only if two cumulative requirements are met: 
the causes for the court interdiction to exist at the time of the conclusion of the juridical act and, at 
the same time, they should be generally known. But the second requirement appears to be excessive 
and difficult to accept. Firstly, it would itself raise interpretation problems, given the used terms – 
“generally known”. Then, it would create significant difficulties as far as proof is concerned. Last but 
not least,  the  reason for  establishing  that  the  lack of  discernment  leads  to  the invalidity  of  the 
juridical act is incomprehensible, as it contradicts the expressly provided (in the previous article – 
1204) requirement according to which consent should be expressed wittingly. 
The reason for which the lack of discernment leads to the annulment of the juridical act is 
exactly  because,  in  such  case,  the  consent  is  not  expressed  wittingly.  And,  in  the  hypothesis 
hereunder, if at the time of the conclusion of the juridical act, due to the causes which subsequently 
determined the placing under interdiction, the person did not have discernment, the requirement for 
the consent to be wittingly expressed is not fulfilled. And that happens independently from the fact of 
weather the respective causes where known or not. The knowledge of the causes which determined 
the lack of discernment has no relevance with regard to the validity of consent. Weather the lack of 
discernment or the causes which have determined it were (“generally”) known or not, the consent 
was  not  validly  expressed.  The  knowledge  of  the  causes  that  determined  the  placing  under 
interdiction could raise the matter of the immoral purpose, but have no relevance regarding the lack 
of discernment. 
A second possible interpretation of the legal disposition would lead to the conclusion that its 
purpose was only to enunciate the possibility of annulling the contract in the hypothesis in which, at 
the time of its conclusion, the causes that later determined the placing under interdiction existed and 
were known, without representing requirements for the sentencing of the annulment. However, this 
interpretation comes with two big flaws. Thus, it does not take into consideration the wording of the 
legal disposition, leaving aside the reference to the knowledge of the causes that determined the 
placing under interdiction. Moreover, in this interpretation, the legal disposition has no effect. The 
possibility  of  sentencing  the  annulment  under  the  given  circumstances  (however  implying  the 
analysis of the extent to which, at the conclusion of the contract, the discernment had been affected) 
exists without the necessity for a legal disposition which expressly mentions it. Meaning, in this 
interpretation, the legal disposition would be futile, which contradicts a traditional interpretation rule 
(that comes from the subject matter of the juridical act) – actus interpretandus est potius ut valeat 
quam ut pereat.
Finally, in another possible interpretation we could assess that the legal disposition institutes a 
presumption  of  lacking  discernment  in  the  hypothesis  in  which,  at  the  time  the  contract  was 
concluded, the causes for the subsequent placing under interdiction existed and were known. This 
interpretation comes with the advantage of finding, for the reference to the knowledge of the causes 
for the placing under interdiction, a justification which would not contradict the requirements for the 
11 See Ch. Larroumet, Droit civil. Les obligations. Le contrat, 2003, 286. 306  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
validity  of  the  consent.  Therewith,  it  would  also  bring  utility  to  the  hereunder  disposition,  by 
admitting its effect of establishing the presumption of lacking discernment. 
This was probably the intention of those who have written the new Civil Code. But the 
enunciation of the disposition is however imperfect, lacking clarity. 
Nevertheless, even if this legal disposition was not to be reformulated or clarified by way of 
the subsequent laws which will be adopted for the application of the Code, I think that this third 
interpretation  can  be  considered  for  the  hereunder  provision,  given  that  the  first  two  present 
inacceptable flaws. 
The lack of discernment at the conclusion of a juridical act leads to the sanction of relative 
nullity of that juridical act.
12
The consent must not be altered by vice 
This requirement urges from the same conscious character of the juridical act, which we have 
already  presented  with  regard  to  the  first  validity  condition  required  for  the  consent.  It  is  also 
imposed by the free character of the juridical act, which determines the necessity of a free will, of a 
party’s (parties’) manifestation of will which is a result of their own decision and not a result of an 
external, unnatural influence. The will which is comprised by the contract must really be the result of 
an inherent psychic process. 
The vices of consent are those circumstances which affect the free and conscious character of 
the will to conclude a juridical act, which alter the psychological process of the formation of consent 
at the conclusion of the respective act. 
As previously shown and same for the abovementioned requirement, this condition regarding 
the vices of consent refers to the qualities the consent should have. In the circumstance in which a 
vice of consent is present an exteriorized manifestation of will exists (hence, consent also exists), but 
it is altered in its intellectual, conscious contents, as the case is with error and undue influence 
(which, implying a misrepresentation of reality, generate the impossibility of a coherent analysis of 
the elements of the juridical act, the failure to assess the latter’s consequences, similarly to the 
hypothesis of lacking discernment), or in its free character, as the case is with duress (which limits 
the freedom of assessment by violently introducing an unnatural element, which is determinant for 
the making of the decision to conclude the juridical act). 
There are also situations that are usually analyzed together with the vices of consent due to 
their  strong  connection  to  the  latter,  in  which  the  consent  is  deemed  to  be  lacking  completely 
(obstacle error and some cases of duress), but these represent more than simple vices of consent, the 
only connection to the latter being the mechanism that produces them, the effects being far more 
serious (they destruct will). 
We should remark that the civil law does not use neither the expression “vices of consent”
13,
which is used by the majority of the authors, nor that of “vices of will”, which is more rarely used, 
12 See G. Boroi, op. cit., pag. 212. For parctical applications see, e.g. Bra ov Appeal Court, s. civ., dec. no. 
374/R/1995, in C.P.J. 1994-1998, 51 (the lack of discernement at the time of making the will); C.A. Bucure ti, s. a III-a 
civ., dec. nr. 2079/1999, în C.P.J.C. 1999, 80 (the lack of discernement at the time of the conclusion of a sale-purchase 
agreement) and dec. no. 3247/1999, în C.P.J.C. 1999, 64 (the lack of discernement at the time of the conclusion of a 
exchange  agreement);  Ia i  Appeal  Court,  s.  civ.,  dec.  no.  193  –  03.11.2000,  in  M.  Gai ,  M.-M.  Pivniceru, 
Jurispruden a Cur ii de Apel Ia i în materie civil  pe anul 2000, (Bucharest, 2001), 47-48; Ploie ti Appeal Court, s. 
civ., dec. no. 282 of 01/02/1999, în Curtea de Apel Ploie ti, Buletinul jurispruden ei, Culegere de practic  judiciar ,
semestrul I, 1999, (Bucharest, 2000), 212-215; Ploie ti Appeal Court, s. civ., dec. no. 3454 – 22/10/1999, in I.-N. Fava, 
M.-L. Belu-Magdo, E. Negulescu, Buletinul jurispruden ei, Culegere de practic  judiciar  a Cur ii de Apel Ploie ti, 
semestrul II, 1999, (Bucharest, 2001), 139-142. 
We would like to specify that the same sanction is provided by the new Civil Code (article 1205). 
13 The new Civil Code use this expression in the very title of the paragraph which deals with this subject 
matter, “The Vices of Consent”, articles 1206-1224. 307
these expressions being creations of the doctrine. As it has already been assessed
14, of the two 
expressions, the more suited (adequate as far exactness is concerned), is the phrase “vices of will”, 
and that is because, on the one hand, the respective vices alter not only the consent but firstly they 
alter the cause (the purpose) of the juridical act
15, which together form the juridical will, and, on the 
other hand, as the notion of consent has two meanings (of unilateral manifestation of will and of 
concurrence of wills), and as vices can be met not only in bilateral or multilateral juridical acts, but 
also in cases of unilateral acts, confusion can be caused by using the other phrase. Nevertheless, not 
wishing to initiate further discussions, I shall use the already traditional expression of “vices of 
consent”, in order to comply, under this aspect, with the majority of the authors. 
The vices of consent are, according to article 953 of the Civil Code, error, undue influence 
and duress. Many of the authors also include lesion in the area of the notion of vices of consent, but 
the qualification of the lesion is, in the light of the in force legislation, subject to controversy. The 
provisions  of  the  new  Civil  Code  eliminate  this  controversy,  by  qualifying  lesion  as  a  vice  of 
consent.
16
The sanction for the case of vitiated consent is, as a general rule, the relative nullity of the 
juridical act. 
However, the analysis of the vices of consent is not subject to the study hereunder. 
The consent must be exteriorized 
This requirement is urged by the very definition of consent: the decision of concluding a 
juridical act, which is manifested in the exterior. 
The requirement regards the existence of the consent and in case it is not fulfilled the latter is 
lacking, as the decision made to conclude a juridical act, if it is not exteriorized, does not have the 
worth of consent. 
Therefore this requirement is equivalent to the condition that consent exists. Nonetheless it 
could have not been named accordingly, as it only covers the hypothesis of the formal, material lack 
of consent, and it is necessary for the latter to exists as far as its contents, substance are regarded, 
meaning it should declare, reflect a real decision to conclude the juridical act. Further, as we shall 
see, sometimes a mere exteriorization of the made decision is not sufficient and it needs to take a 
certain from required by law, in the absence of which consent cannot be deemed as given, at least not 
for the juridical act for which the decision had been made. 
Hence, this requirement establishes the connection between consent and the form of the civil 
juridical act, as the principle and conditions applicable in relation to the form of the juridical act 
regard the very exterior manifestation of will, which is consent. 
Thus, the general rule applicable with regard to the exteriorization of consent is that the mere 
concurrence of the parties’ wills is sufficient for a valid juridical act to be concluded. This means that 
the parties are free to choose the exteriorization form for their will, the way the decision to conclude 
the contract is brought to knowledge remaining irrelevant as long as it takes place. 
There are though exceptions
17 from this rule, as the case of those juridical acts for which the 
law requires that the manifestation of will takes a certain, special form, a form tha is required ad
validitatem.
14 G. Boroi, op. cit., 214; A. Pop, Gh. Beleiu, Curs de drept civil. Partea general , (Bucharest, 1973), 268-269. 
15 In fact they alter the cause and, indirectly, the consent. 
16 Article 1206 align. 2 of the new Civil Code. 
17 For some juridical acts an express manifestation of will is necessary (acts for which a particular form is 
required ad validitatem, the acceptance of a donation – article 814 align. 2 of the Civil Code, the conventional solidarity 
in civil law – articles 1034 and 1042 of the Civil Code, et cetera). 308  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
In such cases, it is mandatory that the parties’ will is expressed and acknowledged in the form 
required by law and cannot otherwise produce any effects or, at any rate, not quite the effects that the 
parties had in mind. 
We must not leave aside the form requirement ad probationem because, although it does not 
affect the validity of the juridical act, in case the parties’ manifestation of will does not fulfill the 
mandatory form, due to the probation issues, it could come to producing no legal effects. 
The form required for the contract to be opposable to third parties does not generally concern 
the  matter  of  the  manifestation  of  consent,  as  it  presumes  the  fulfillment  of  some  formalities 
subsequent to the conclusion of the juridical act and, hence, to the exteriorization of the manifestation 
of will. 
The manifestation of will can be exteriorized expressly, when it is expressed in ways liable to 
directly transmit it to the counterparties or to third parties (irrespective of the used practical means: 
verbally, in the case of persons that are present, by phone, fax, e-mail, by documents, by signs
18), or 
tacitly, when it is implied, as from the parties action or attitude the intention of concluding a contract 
results. 
For  example,  article  689  Civil  Code  provides  the  cases  when  the  acceptance  of  the 
inheritance is express and when it is tacit. The tacit manifestation of will present the advantage of 
saving time, though it sometimes comes with the disadvantage of being equivocal. Moreover, such 
manifestation is excluded in the case of some of the legal acts, as those for which a certain form is 
required ad validitatem.
The means of exteriorization are diverse. Therefore, consent can be verbally expressed (for 
consensual juridical act), the agreement being considered fulfilled as soon as the parties have stated 
their harmonious will to fulfill the agreement. Another mean of expressing consent is represented by 
the  deeds,  in  their  authentic  (usually  requested  by  solemn  agreements) form  or  in  their  private 
signature form (these being requested ad validitatem or in other cases ad probationem). Consent can 
be also expressed through conclusive actions or gestures (e.g.: an idle taxicab with the “vacant” light 
on, holding your hand up when asking to buy a newspaper etc.) 
A specific issue regarding the exteriorization of consent is establishing the judicial value of 
silence (seen as the absence of any exterior manifestations). 
It is unanimously considered that, on principle, silence does not mean consent, as civil law 
does not follow the adage “qui tacit consentire videtur (“qui n edit mot consent”).  
Still, there are certain situations when, by exception, silence is considered an expression of 
will in fulfilling an agreement, as follows:  
when the law specifically provides this (e.g.: article 1437 of the Civil Code
19);
when the parties establish by express will that silence is to be considered consent (.e.g.: by 
pre-contract or even contract when establishing the means of renewing an agreement or denouncing 
it)
20;
18  See,  e.g., R.  Bercea, Consim mântul virtual  i consim mântul real în contractele  încheiate în mediul 
electronic, in Dreptul no. 1/2004, 90 and fl. 
19 Article 1437 states that “after the lease term has expired, if the tenant does not move out and is left in 
possession, the lease is being considered renewed, its effects being regulated by the rules regarding the no term lease”. 
Therefore, the text establishes the tacitly renewal of the lease.  
20 I would like to mention that the significance granted to silence must be the result of the parties’ agreement 
and not the statement of a single party by itself. This is why we cannot take into consideration the example given by 
some authors (see D. Alexandresco, Explica iune teoretic i practic  a dreptului civil român în compara iune cu legile 
vechi si cu principalele legisla iuni str ine, (Iasi 1898), 44): not replying to a letter sent by a merchant that considers 
the recipient his debtor (a common practice these days as well) could be regarded as an acceptance of debt by the 
recipient. 309
when silence is considered consent according to custom.  In theory, these situations are 
called  “circumstantiated  silence”,  when  the  regularity  of  previous  contractual  relations  between 
parties and customs do not impose an express acceptance to contract
21.
Apart from these situations, there are a few other cases when silence is to be considered 
consent: 
in matters of offer and acceptance, when the offer is made exclusively to benefit the other 
party, the latter’s silence is seen as acceptance
22;
when, at the request of one party, the other party fulfills the obligation, without having to 
expressly answer, in which case, the latter’s silence is considered acceptance
23.
Italian theoreticians state that, for silence to be regarded as consent, the usual way of taking 
action or good faith, in the parties’ relations, must impose the obligation to talk, or that according to a 
given specific historical or social timeline and regarding the quality of the parties and their business 
relations, one party’s silence should be understood as its acceptance of the other party’s will.
24
Consent must be expressed with the intention of producing juridical effects 
(animo contrahendi negotii).
This requirement, also expressed as “consent must be stated as a juridical commitment”
25,
emerges right from the essence of the civil juridical act, which is an exercise of will with the intent of 
producing juridical effects. 
The requirement concerns the existence of consent in its substantial form. Consent is the 
decision  to  fulfill  an  agreement,  revealed  to  the  exterior.  This  decision  essentially  implies  the 
intention to engage in juridical  acts,  to modify or extinguish juridical relations, in other words, 
precisely fulfilling the requirement in case. 
Not fulfilling this requirement is equivalent to not making a decision on fulfilling a juridical 
act, or to not expressing it through an exterior act of will. There would be a statement of will creating 
apparent consent, but it would not be related to a decision made as to fulfill the juridical act. Consent 
would exist merely as a frame without content. 
Thereby, we will consider this requirement not to be fulfilled, as consent is expressed without 
the intent of producing juridical effects, in the following cases
26:
1. When the expression of will has been stated as a joke (jocandi causa), out of friendship, 
courtesy, or pure compliancy
27. In these cases, the intention of assuming a juridical agreement is 
obviously  missing,  possibly  remaining  in  the  area  of  moral  obligations,  unsusceptible  of  being 
accomplished, if needed, through the coercive force of the state. If, in certain circumstances, some 
juridical effects could be born out of such acts, they would not originate in juridical acts, but in 
21 The silence of a customer of a regular provider, who picks up the merchandise left at his doorstep, with no 
will exchange, being possible, is considered to be a sale; see D. Cosma, Teoria general  a actului juridic civil, 128. 
22 C.St nescu, C. Bârsan, Drept civil. Teoria general  a obliga iilor, edition IX, (Bucharest, 2008), 48; D. 
Cornoiu,  Drept  Civil,  Partea  generala,  (Bucharest,  2000),  142;  A.  Pop,  Gh.  Beleiu,  Curs  de  drept  civil.  Partea 
general , (Bucharest, 1973), 267; A. Cojocaru, Drept civil. Partea general , (Bucharest, 2000), 191. 
23 I. Dogaru, op.cit., 72-73. In this case, this silence is not in the above mentioned sense, an expression of will 
being revealed through the execution of the obligation. 
24 See Cass, sez. lav., 1603.07, n. 6162, in Mass. Giust civ., 2007, 3 cited by L. Viola, Il contratto. Validita, 
inadempimento, risarciemento, vol. 1, CEDAM, 2009, 718.  
25 Tr. Iona cu, Tratat de drept civil, Vol. I, Partea general , (Bucharest, 1967), 263.  
26 For qualifying these situations as “non-juridical” expressions of will, see P. Vasilescu, Manifest ri de voin
non-juridice, in P.R. no. 1/2003, 239 and fol.  
27 The juridical literature offers many examples on this matter: promising to pay someone a visit, attempting to 
come to the aid of a stranded motorist, in general providing free of charge services to others. See Tr. Iona cu, op.cit.,
page 263, A. Cojocaru, op.cit., page 191, M. Mure an, P. Ciacli, Drept Civil. Partea general , (Cluj-Napoca, 2000), 
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simple juridical actions (e.g.: the obligation to indemnify for damages resulting out of an  illicit 
action)
28.
The French doctrine
29 took into consideration, regarding the compliance of wills, compliances 
of wills that are “non-compulsory”, as follows: “acts of courtesy or compliancy” and “honorable 
commitments”. 
“Acts of courtesy or compliancy”. There are compliant  wills  that do not oblige, from  a 
juridical point of view, because the parties involved did not want to establish a juridical relation that 
would allow the claim of an obligation.
30 This is the case with political promises that do not oblige, 
legally speaking, their authors
31. Compliancy acts can be seen as agreements based on “fashionable 
relations”, which only compel to courtesy rules (an invitation made and accepted does not represent 
a legal contract)
32 . Among friends, people one knows, or family members, promises are often being 
made, and there is an agreement as to what aspects impose a certain “interdependence”: children are 
being promised trips or various items in exchange for their progress in school; promises to visit back 
are being made; meetings for recreational purposes are being set in a certain place; certain services 
are being promised etc. 
All of these examples are non-juridical acts, as the parties involved do not want to establish 
juridical relations or to capitalize the promised advantages through legal means. They are simply the 
result of a mannerly conduct and of natural bonds between people, with no legal connotations. 
The borderline between a contract and a “courtesy act” appears to be more difficult to draw, 
especially when it comes to providing free of charge services. 
Various activities can be performed based exclusively on the courtesy and kindness of the 
person assuming these responsibilities: small favors you do for a family member, a friend or a 
neighbor; help and advice in case of illness; counseling by a specialist in different fields (legal, 
financial, technical etc.); hauling people and goods free of charge etc. We can easily notice that these 
activities can represent the object of well defined legal provisions, resulting from proper contracts 
(work, contracting, counseling, transport etc.). What sets them apart is not the characteristic of being 
performed with no interest in gaining something,  but rather their cause and their effects. These 
operations lack a legal cause, what is being performed is based on friendship or family bonds, and the 
effects are different. There is no doubt that not carrying out- lato sensu- a convention will lead to an 
assumption of responsibility for the culpable party, an unconceivable fact when it comes to courtesy 
acts. 
28 M. Mure an, P. Ciacli, op.cit., 120. 
29 See F. Terre, Ph. Simler, Y. Lequette, Droit Civil. Les obligations, 58-60. 
30 See the French jurisprudence, Paris Appeal Court, the 26
th of September 1995, R.T.D. Civ. 1996, 143, 
observations by J. Mestre- in a contract, the parties “make promises and assume obligations; there are only promises 
made with the intention of assuming obligations, granting the other party the right to claim their fulfillment, resulting in 
a contract and a convention. But there are also other promises that we make in good faith and with genuine will to 
fulfill them, but without the intent of granting the other party the right to claim their fulfillment. In other words, the 
person that makes the promise also states that he/she does not assume an obligation, this being made possible in some 
situations by certain qualities of the one making the promise or the one for whom the promise is being made. For 
example, when a father promises his son, a law student, that he will reward him with a pleasure trip, provided that he 
manages his time properly, it is obvious that the father, while making a promise, does not assume an obligation, not in a 
juridical sense anyway. 
31 See Paris Court of Appeal, 18
th of October 1994, R.T.D. Civ. 1995, 351, observations by J. Mestre. For the 
situation in which a journalist’s press accreditation for some private charity events can be considered a contract, see 
T.G.I. Paris, 7
th of October 1996, R.T.D. Civ. 1997, 126, observations by J.Mestre.  
32 E. H. Perreau, “Courtoisie, Complaisance et usage non obligatoires devant la Jurisprudence”, R.T.D. Civ. 
1914, 481 and following; D. Mayer, “L’amitie”, JCP, 1974, I, 2663; P. Bedoura, “Amitie et le droit civil”, (Poitiers, 
1976). 311
Still, the French doctrine and jurisprudence has seen a great deal of controversy over the 
juridical nature of an act of assistance
33. In order for the person that suffers a prejudice to receive 
compensation,  the  jurisprudence  based  it,  on  several  cases,  on  tort  liability  or  on  business 
administration. However there are also court decisions that  admit the existence of an assistance 
convention, a solution that reveals a strong artificial character
34.
See, for example, the case of free labor performance for the benefit of a neighbor or a friend, 
as well as in the situation of free medical services
35. If the solution characterization removes some 
solutions to these contractual benefits, most analyze the relationships within the voluntary help of a 
free service contract. If some of the answers dismiss the solution of qualifying these benefits
36 as 
contractual, others analyze the voluntary help relationships within a free service agreement
37.
However, when it comes to these complaisance acts, tort liability is the only liability that can 
be undertaken, with the application of the ordinary law on the matter and with no juridical connection 
with the fact that the prejudice was triggered by the “performance” of said complaisance act. The 
hypothesis that circumscribes itself best to the last situation is represented by the damage caused 
during the voluntarily conveyance of passengers and goods. In this case, it was decided that the act of 
complaisance of the "carrier" can only be the source of tort liability, with the obligation, legal of 
course, to repair the damage caused by his act or his work. Tort liability applies here, not due to the 
fact that the conveyance is voluntary and free, but due to the fact that its source is not a legal 
agreement, the act of “carriage” lacking legal cause (obviously, the parties’ intent to undertake legal 
obligations  is  lacking)
38.  A  legal  agreement  will  be  needed  though,  in  the  situation  of  paid 
hitchhiking. 
The situation of remanding various goods, of varied values, in the occasion of the anniversary 
of an event. It was also argued that we give and receive such objects, without any liberal intention, 
without being impressed of the object’s value, without expecting gratitude or the return of the gift. 
No trace of legal intent can be detected in these acts, and any attempt to detect a juridical cause in 
such expression of will or the intention to make such realities into legal relationships, which the 
"parties" ought to execute by the force of the law, falls on the ridiculous
39.
It is also true that the tradition of gifts is only occasional and individual, with the clearly 
stated  aim  of  producing  pleasure  and  joy  to  another  whom,  in  turn,  appreciates  the  gesture  of 
kindness of the former. Therefore, it is clear that the intentional spring of such gestures comes from 
the more or less sincere affection we have for each other. But this is the case, when will is expressed 
with the intention of it taking legal effects, namely to convey property. It is the typical situation of 
the manual gift, a variety of donation. It is true that, beyond the remanding of the good, the parties 
have no legal obligations. And it is also true that, forced execution is not the case, because the only 
assumed obligation, the remanding of the good, was performed (without the delivery of the good, the 
legal act does not exist). However, the fact that the producing of legal effects was intended, namely 
the transfer of property, is enough, in order to describe the manifestation of will, as a legal act 
33 See R. Bout, “La convention dite d’assisttance”, Melanges Kayser, 1979, pages 157 and following; C. Roy- 
Loustanau, “Du domage eprouve en portent assistance benevole a autrui”, Aix thesis, 1980. 
34 See F. Terre, Ph. Simler, Y. Lequette, “Droit civil. Les obligations”, op. cit., page 60. 
35 A. Rouast, La prestation gratuite de travail, Études Capitant, (1939), 695; M. Boitard, Les contrats de 
services gratuits, (Paris 1941); F. Grua, L’acte gratuit en droit commercial, (Paris 1978); A. Viander, La complaisance,
in JCP, 1980, I, 2987, quoted by F. Terré, Ph. Simler, Y. Lequette, Droit civil. Les obligations, 59 
36 See: Cass., 2
e civ., dec. of 18.03.1992, n JCP 1992, IV, 1525; dec. of 26.01.1994, in R.T.D. Civ. 1994, 864, 
obs. by Jourdain; Cass., 1
re civ., dec. of 07.04.1998, 1050; Cass., 2
e civ., dec. of 10.06.1998, in JCP 1999, II, 10042. 
37 See: Cass., 1
re civ., dec. of 08.11.1977, 10.10.1995, 16.07.1997, 17.12.1996 and 13.01.1998, quoted by Ph. 
Simler, Y. Lequette, Droit civil. Les obligations, op. cit., pag. 59. 
38  Driver's  liability  can  only  tort  liability.  For  an  international  application,  see  Cass.,  1
re  civ.,  dec.  of 
06.04.1994, in JCP 1994, I, 3781, no. 1, obs. by Fabre-Magnan, and in R.T.D. Civ. 1994, 866, obs. by Jourdain. 
39 See, P. Vasilescu, Relativitatea  i obligativitatea actului juridic. Repere pentru o nou  teorie general  a 
actului de drept privat, (Bucharest, 2003), 94-95. 312  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
(moreover, if this operation was not qualified as mentioned the transmittal of property could not be 
justified, because legal effects could not be acknowledged as far as a non-juridical act is concerned). 
And the consideration of the person, the wish to bring them joy, have legal relevance themselves, 
representing the very determinant reason for the conclusion of the juridical act, which is one of the 
two elements that form the cause of the juridical act. 
„Gentlemen’s agreements”. It  happens  that  some  people  commit  themselves  to "honor". 
Designated also by the term "gentleman's agreement", this practice is more common than might 
appear  at  first  sight,  whether  we  refer  to  family,  professional,  economic  relations  or  frienship. 
However, these agreements call for an answer to the next question: are they binding or not
40?
Since  these  agreements  fall  within  the  field  of  family  relationships,  they  generally  seem 
devoid of such binding, revealing themselves as convenience relationships or courtesy relationships. 
For  the  other  relationships  mentioned,  things  are  not  the  same.  Whether  they  wanted  to 
compensate a lack of the law or to "escape" the enforcement of certain rules, or – even simpler, but 
perhaps more significant – to have had understood, by hesitation or repugnance, not to engage "in a 
valid form", the parties of these agreements seek much less to evade the effects of the law, then to 
situate their agreement outside of the state law field. But the state law does not acknowledge this 
separation and interprets gentlemen’s agreements as legally binding for their authors, according to 
the commune rules of contracts, the case law stating the same effect
41. The intention of the parties to 
take their agreement outside the limits for the application of the law is not relevant in the area of the 
analysis hereunder. It is sufficient that the parties’ intention of concluding a binding agreement is 
established for that agreement to be qualified  as being a juridical act. Further, it is an issue of 
interpretation left in order to establish the contents of the parties’ manifested will, respectively, what 
are the effects which the parties had in mind. Surely, the issue of the intention of the parties of 
undertaking obligations by way of such agreements must be assessed from case to case, as the 
hypothesis in which such an intention did not, actually, exist cannot be excluded. 
Therefore,  the  distinction  between  the  non-legal  expressions  of  will  and  the  legal  ones 
sometimes raise difficulties. Without being able to enunciate a general rule, some elements are in this 
respect,  helpful.  For  example:  the  gratuity  of  the  benefit,  the  type  of  benefit,  the  scope  of  the 
agreement, the legal and economic importance of the transaction, the value of the good, the risk of 
making the benefit. But these can only act as signs that delimitate the expression of will that produces 
legal effects from the one that lacks such effects.  
2. When consent was given under a pure potestative condition by the part that binds (Article 
1010 Civil Code
42), namely under the form "I bind if I want to", being interpreted that such a 
condition is practically equivalent to the lack of intent to be bound - "sub hac conditione, si taken yet.  
3. When the expression of will is too vague, the intention of undertaking a legal commitment 
or  the  content  of  such  legal  engagement,  that  the  party  intends  to  undertake,  are  not  resulting 
unequivocally. 
4. When the one to whom the declaration of will is being addressed to, knows that its author 
gave it without the intention of legally engaging himself, or as commonly referred to in the legal 
literature, when the expression of will was made with a mental remoteness (reservatio mentalis)
known by its recipient. I preferred to avoid this enunciation because it contains a mistake: as long as 
the  remoteness  is  known  by  another  person  as  well,  no  longer  can  it  be  qualified  as  mental 
40 See: K. Zweidert, Du sérieux de la promesse. Remarques de droit comparé sur la distinction des actes qui 
obligent et des actes qui n’obligent pas, (1964), 33 and fol.; B. Beignier, L’honneur et le droit, (Paris, 1995), 562 and 
fol.; D. Ammar, Essai sur le rôle de l’engagement d’honneur, (Paris, 1990), 396 and fol. 
41 For details on the solutions adopted by the French doctrine and practice in the matter, see F. Terré, Ph. 
Simler, Y. Lequette, Droit civil. Les obligations, op. cit., 60 and P. Vasilescu, Relativitatea actului juridic civil (...), 99-
100.
42 Article 1010 of the Civil Code provides that „the obligation is void when affected by a potestative condition 
on behalf of the undertaker”. 313
remoteness because, hypothetically, it was already expressed. However, the idea is clear. It refers to 
the situation in which the lack of intention to be bound, the remoteness is known by the other party, 
but hidden from the others, third parties. Namely, it creates an appearance of legal commitment, 
contradicted by the secret understanding between the parties. Certainly, simulation also falls under 
this hypothesis (it represents the case presented above, under the form of the fictitious act
43).
It should be noted however that in such a case, the juridical act, and thus the consent can be 
considered valid in relation to good faith third parties.  
Some authors consider that other requirements relating to consent should also be met, such as: 
"consent should emanate from one of the legal act’s parties
44", “consent should come form a person 
with full legal capacity
45", "consent should be reliable
46"," consent should be precise
47", "will should 
be free
48"," will should be conscious
49".
However, it is not necessary that these requirements should be retained, due to their futility, or 
their being included in the content of other such requirements, or, in fact, their not concerning the 
consent.  
Thus, the requirement that consent must emanate from one of the juridical act’s parties is 
unnecessary. The party expressing its will shall be bound, as a party of the juridical act (except when 
the party acts as a legal mandate). It makes no sense to look at the problem form a reversed point of 
view, namely, to first establish the parties and then to identify a new requirement for the expression 
of consent. And if the point was to evoke the idea that nobody can be bound without his consent, it is 
a matter beyond our discussion regarding consent, being related to the legal effects of the juridical 
act, namely, the principle of relativity that applies to them.  
The requirement for consent to come from a person with full legal capacity refers to, in fact, 
another condition of the juridical act, namely the capacity. It is certain that, in order to validly 
conclude a legal act it is required that all its essential requirements should be met, but also, said 
requirements should be considered separately and the validity of one of them is not to be confused 
with the validity of the juridical act itself. In any case, the requirement is also inaccurate, because not 
only those with full legal capacity can perform juridical acts; for example, minors between 14 and 18 
years old may conclude certain legal acts by themselves, even without prior approval. 
The requirement of being reliable is included in the content of the requirement stating that 
consent must be expressed with the intent of producing juridical effects. 
The requirement of being precise regards the object of the juridical act, which needs to be 
determined or determinable, or the offer. In any case, to the extent that it could regard the consent, it 
would be also included in the content of the requirement of being expressed with the intent of 
producing juridical effects, which implies, as we have seen, the expression of will to be clear Even 
more, the expression of will can also be tacit, and therefore not quite precise, nevertheless being 
given a value of consent.  
At last, the conditions stating that the will should be free and also conscious represents the 
presentation, under a different name, of the requirements regarding the lack of consent vices and the 
existence of discernment. 
43 See D. Cosma, op. cit., 120; E. Lupan, op. cit., 215; P. Vasilescu, Relativitatea (...), op. cit., 73 and fol. 
44 R.P. Vonica, Drept civil. Partea general , (Bucharest, 2001), 562. 
45 R.P. Vonica, op. cit., 562; Tr. Iona cu, op. cit., 263. 
46 Tr. Iona cu, op. cit., 263-264, V.V. Bica, I. Burghelea, Drept civil. Teoria general . Persoanele, (Bucharest, 
2001), 59. 
47 Idem.
48 V.V. Bica, I. Burghelea, op. cit., pag. 58-59. 
49 Idem, as in the previous note, this is about the authors’ references to the work of another author, regarding 
to which I think a misinterpretation occured. In that work there are no additional requirements concerning consent, but 
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In the end, I would like to mention that the sanction that intervenes for not fulfilling the 
requirements for consent is the nullity of the juridical act in case. We will have absolute void when 
the  conditions  regarding  the  existence  of  consent  are  missing,  both  its  formal  existence-  not 
exteriorizing the consent (in this case, as a general rule, no sanction can exist as the juridical act itself 
does not exist, not even having an apparent validity), and also in the existence of the content, of the 
decision made to fulfill a juridical act- lack of intention to produce juridical effects, the obstacle 
error
50  and  some  violent  situations.  On  the  other  hand,  we  will  have  relative  nullity  when  the 
conditions regarding the quality of consent are not fulfilled, the free and conscious character- lack of 
discernment or the existence of a vice of consent. 
Conclusions 
As we have seen, the validity requirements for consent still represents a present subject, an 
ampler approach being needed, from a perspective that also includes aspects which are especially 
revealed in the French doctrine. The present study completes the classic approach to the subject in 
discussion.  The  analysis  can  serve  for  a  better  understanding  of  the  notion  of  consent,  of  the 
requirements for its validity and for a correct appraisal  of  the situations in which these are not 
fulfilled, leading to the application of the specific sanction, the nullity of the juridical act. Evidently, 
nevertheless, the subject is far from exhaustion. On the one hand, the matters taken into consideration 
in the present study need an ampler analysis and, on the other hand, other aspects have been left out, 
as the case is with the matter of the vices of consent. But these matters shall be object to future 
studies. 
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